Area Bombing by Day: Bomber Command and the Daylight Offensive, 1944–1945 by Peloquin, Laurie
Canadian Military History
Volume 15 | Issue 3 Article 3
4-26-2012
Area Bombing by Day: Bomber Command and the
Daylight Offensive, 1944–1945
Laurie Peloquin
Wilfrid Laurier University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military
History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
Peloquin, Laurie (2006) "Area Bombing by Day: Bomber Command and the Daylight Offensive, 1944–1945," Canadian Military
History: Vol. 15: Iss. 3, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol15/iss3/3
27© Canadian Military History, Volume 15, Numbers 3 & 4, Summer-Autumn 2006, pp.27-42.
This article will examine an important butneglected phase of the Allied strategic
bomber offensive in the Second World War. Given
the very rich literature on the bombing war1 it is
surprising to discover that little attention has
been paid to the daylight attacks undertaken by
Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command in the
fall and winter of 1944-1945. Nowhere in the
existing literature is there a systematic analysis
of this period of operations when the RAF and
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) carried out 153
daylight raids between 27 August 1944 and 24
April 1945.2 Two primary issues will be
addressed. The first concerns the accuracy
achieved by Bomber Command in its daylight
missions. The second is to determine if the
reintroduction of daylight attacks resulted in
Bomber Command carrying out a different and
more selective targeting policy. Both of these
issues are related to the more general question
of the role played by Air Marshal Sir Arthur
Harris in shaping the policy of Bomber
Command. Harris’s name is usually associated
with a doctrinaire commitment to area bombing
in general and the destruction of German civilian
housing in particular. The evidence presented
in this essay will allow the reader to form a more
complete picture of Harris’s response to the
changing circumstances of the war.
* * * * *
Remembering the long and deadly stalematesencountered in the First World War, the
major powers searched for a way to bring
decisiveness to the battlefield. In Britain Sir Hugh
Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff from 1919 to
1929, advocated an offensive bombing strategy
based on the view that “war could be won by
producing such moral effect on the civilian
population of the enemy that its government
would have to sue for peace.”3 During the 1930’s,
the British Air Staff refined this concept.
Bombing of key German industrial,
transportation and oil facilities would deliver a
“knock-out blow” to the German economy. This
view dominated air force planning in the early
1930’s. With the outbreak of war, the RAF held
cautiously optimistic views regarding the value
and possible results of a bombing campaign, but
this attitude was based on little more than hope.
By the end of 1939 it became clear that
daylight bombing was too costly for the RAF and
would not cause any serious difficulty to
Germany.4 Over the first few months of 1940
Bomber Command engaged in very little activity
apart from reconnaissance flights and leaflet
drops. The situation changed markedly after the
Germans dropped bombs on the Dutch city of
Rotterdam on 15 May. The War Cabinet reacted
by removing the order restraining bombers from
attacks near civilian areas.5 High loss rates
during daylight hours, 5.7 percent in May and
June 1940, resulted in major raids being
confined to hours of darkness, when, during
these same months, the loss rate was 2.9
percent.6 By the autumn of 1940 night bombing
had taken precedence, as daylight missions were
limited to smaller and more specialized
operations.7
Bomber Command underwent nothing less
than a complete transformation by the time it
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returned to large-scale daylight operations in
1944-1945. The availability of aircraft and crews
had increased from 506 in November 1941 to
1,609 by April 1945. The light, two-engined
bombers had been completely replaced by heavy
four-engined aircraft that could carry much
larger payloads further, with the formidable Avro
Lancaster accounting for the majority of planes
available (1,087) by the last few months of the
war.8 The lightweight wooden de Havilland
Mosquito was also available in large numbers.
Originally put into service to find and mark
targets, the speed (350 mph) and ceiling (33,000
feet) of the Mosquito made it invaluable as a
bomber as well.9
The years of night bombing had forced
Bomber Command to address the problem of
target location. This led to the development of a
succession of electronic aids, Gee, Oboe, H2S
and G-H, which, despite effective German radio
counter-measures such as “jamming,” enabled
the bombers to attack with increasing accuracy,
even when the target was completely obscured
on moonless or cloudy nights. Gee was a
“passive” system in which directional radio
pulses from ground stations allowed the aircraft
to plot its position. Oboe was a two-way system,
in which a transponder in the aircraft enabled
ground plotting staff to bring the aircraft over
the target. Like Gee it was “line of sight” whose
range was limited by the curvature of the earth,
and thus against targets deep inside Germany it
was primarily used by high-flying Mosquitoes of
the Pathfinder Force that dropped target markers
for the main force. H2S, by contrast, was a
ground-mapping radar carried in the aircraft.
Although excellent for navigation, it proved to
be of limited effectiveness for target-finding in
built-up areas, which appeared as a large blur
on the cathode-ray tube. It worked well, however,
in conjunction with Oboe, and with G-H, an
upgrade of Gee widely used starting in the fall of
1944 that featured two-way communication with
ground stations for target finding and was more
flexible than Oboe.10
The preparations for the invasion of
Normandy diverted Bomber Command from its
night area bombing offensive of German cities
to operations in support of the upcoming land
battle in France. The necessity of bombing rail
yards in French cities to prevent German
reinforcement of the invasion area without killing
very large numbers of French civilians required
a level of precision that forced a reevaluation of
daylight bombing.
Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, who had
become commander -in-chief of Bomber
Command in 1942, strongly opposed any
suggestion that Bomber Command attempt
RAF Lancasters bomb through cloud during a
daylight raid over France during the summer of 1944.
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daylight attacks against precision targets. He
claimed that his force was operationally
incapable of performing under the very different
circumstances of daylight, and strongly clung to
his belief that Bomber Command would be far
more useful against area targets.11 But, his
superior, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal,
Chief of the Air Staff, was equally convinced that
Harris underestimated the capabilities of his
force. To test those capabilities, Portal ordered
a series of raids against six railway marshalling
yards in France.12
Events proved Portal to be correct. The
attacks, which began on the night of 6/7 March
1944, were successful, and reported “enormous
damage” to the railway facilities, although some
bombs hit civilian areas.13 Over the next few
months Bomber Command made the majority
of its attacks on precision targets in France, flying
just under 9,000 sorties, as well as making 3,000
sorties into Germany.14 Aircrews were perfecting
their ability to hit specific targets accurately at
night. This skill would benefit them greatly when
large-scale daylight attacks began as the whole
of the British and US heavy bomber forces began
to support directly the Allied armies in the
invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944, and in
the intense battles that raged for ten weeks
thereafter. Still, the effectiveness of what often
amounted to close support by heavy bombers
remains controversial. Extensive cratering of the
ground and reduction of German-held towns to
readily defensible rubble at times impeded Allied
troops, and, despite significant achievements in
precision attacks, lapses in the bomber crews’
navigation and target identification resulted on
several occasions in heavy losses to friendly
forces.
With the Allied victory in Normandy control
of Bomber Command returned from General
Eisenhower’s headquarters to the Royal Air
Force, which reassessed its strategy. There were
important new opportunities, because the
progress of Allied ground forces deprived the
Luftwaffe of its forward air defence radars,
meaning that Allied bombers would encounter
much less effective interception.15 The debate as
to what should have priority turned on three
major target systems: oil, communications and
transport, and industrial areas. Air Chief
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A Halifax of 6 Group RCAF makes a daylight attack on an oil refinery in the Ruhr during October 1944.
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Marshal Portal favoured oil as the primary target
objective in shutting down the German war
machine, a view advocated by General Carl
Spaatz, commander of the US Eighth Air Force.
Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, deputy
commander to General Eisenhower, believed that
a broader effort to destroy the enemy ’s
transportation and communication capabilities,
as the bombers had already successfully done
in France in preparation for the Normandy
invasion, would paralyze the enemy’s war-
making abilities much more quickly than an
assault on oil resources.16 As always, Arthur
Harris preferred area targeting of German
cities.17 Throughout 1944 Harris continued to
refer to both oil and transport as “panacea”
targets, insisting that the destruction of a single
type of target would never bring Germany to its
knees. Harris, however, was also subject to the
decisions of others, and would prove to be a
more or less obedient agent of senior authorities.
Oil became the top priority in a directive
jointly issued by the commanding officers of both
the RAF and the USAAF on 25 September 1944,
followed by German rail and waterborne
transport systems. Direct support of land and
naval operations also took precedence over
industrial areas, which were to be attacked only
“when weather or tactical conditions are
unsuitable for operations against specific
primary objectives.”18
Bomber Command, in fact, began its daylight
raids nearly a month before, on 27 August 1944,
against the Rheinpreussen synthetic oil refinery
at Homberg/Meerbeck. Cloud cover over the
target was 7/10ths and the attack took place
using the same Oboe marking techniques and
green target indicators used in night raids.19 The
raid was described as only “moderately
successful” because the overall bombing was
widely dispersed and the refinery, although
damaged, was not shut down. Yet, although flak
had been reported as “heavy” over the target, no
bombers were shot down and the escorting
squadrons of Spitfires drove off the Luftwaffe.20
Overall, the results were encouraging.
On 3 September 1944, 675 aircraft
participated in daylight raids against six German
airfields in Holland, targeting runways and
hangars. Only one Halifax bomber was lost to
flak over Venlo.21 All of the operations were
described as successful in the Group
Summaries, as in the case of Soesterburg:
“bombs seen straddling the runways and
bursting among buildings…fire and many new
craters in runway.”22 Photo reconnaissance
confirmed these claims and similar results were
obtained on five subsequent raids.23
The oil offensive resumed on 11 September
with raids against three plants, Castrop-Rauxel,
Kamen and Gelsenkirchen, with visual evidence
Above left: An Avro Lancaster attacks the city centre of Münster, Germany, 19 September 1944.  Above right: Two
Lancasters have a close encounter during a daylight mission over Koblenz, Germany, 29 December 1944.  Both aircraft
made it back to base. This mission was undertaken to interdict the railway yards in Koblenz, which were one of the main
transportation hubs supporting the German attack in the Ardennes.
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of considerable damage at the first of these
targets. Although German fighters did not appear
to challenge the strong escort of twenty-six fighter
squadrons, a total of nine bombers were lost to
flak and 90 others, from a total of 129
despatched to the target, received some flak
damage in this raid. Total losses for the day
amounted to 2.4 percent, and overall the results
were not outstanding as heavy flak had prevented
good bombing concentrations.24 Dortmund,
Scholven/Buer and Wanne-Eickel, three oil
targets, were attacked the next day, and the
Nordstern plant at Gelsenkirchen was attacked
again on the 13th. All four assaults damaged the
targets, with severe destruction reported at
several buildings at the Nordstern plant.25
Bomber Command’s Operational Research
Section cautiously estimated that the raids to
date had caused a total reduction of 5 percent
of the output, but warned that repairs would
soon restore production unless the attacks
continued.26 Attention shifted away from oil in
mid-September when Bomber Command was
again needed to assist the army, including
bombardment of the fortified Channel Ports in
support of the Canadians, but at the end of the
month Bomber Command made attacks on oil
facilities at Sterkrade and Bottrop. Bad weather
and cloud cover prevented these raids from
causing much damage.27
In the four weeks before the issuance of the
oil directive on 25 September 1944, Bomber
Command had already begun daylight operations
against those targets. However vocal in his
disagreement with oil as the overriding priority,
Harris was by no means opposed to striking such
targets as part of a larger offensive.
Area targets, Harris’s preference, and
communication targets rounded out the daylight
schedule for Bomber Command in September
1944. Emden’s central district and docks were
the objectives for attacks on 6 September. With
the advantage of daytime visibility, the bombers
were able to fly at a very low altitude, under 2,000
feet, to avoid early warning systems, and the
Germans were unable to deploy a smoke screen
over the city only when it was too late.28
Enormous fires caused severe damage to the
heart of the city’s business and residential
sections, several small ships were sunk, and the
submarine building yard received major damage
to its engineering shops and foundries.29 A raid
on Munster on the 12th also produced serious
destruction. Many buildings still burned 15
hours after the attack, which caused almost
complete devastation to a large section of the
town, including severe damage to the main rail
station and several warehouses, factory and
industrial buildings. The raid was described as
“an extremely good attack.”30 The town of
Osnabruck was targeted on 13 September, with
the primary objective being the interruption of
railway communications. Photo reconnaissance
four days later showed extensive damage to the
marshalling yard, railway workshops and post
office, as well as devastation in the town centre.
The group summary report remarked that the
aiming point had been “wiped out.”31 At the time
of the photo reconnaissance, no repair work had
been attempted.32 Total losses for the three raids
amounted to three aircraft, all due to flak.33 The
success of these three attacks, added to the
achievements against oil targets, proved Bomber
Command to be more than capable as a daylight
force when weather conditions were right and
enemy flak limited.
In spite of the addition of daylight raids, the
losses suffered by Bomber Command were
significantly lower than the rate of three to four
percent in 1943. This improvement was largely
the result of the Luftwaffe’s difficulties which
included disruption of fighter production, heavy
losses of fighters, a lack of trained pilots, fuel
shortages and the loss to the advancing Allied
armies of much of the early warning radar
system.34
An analysis of a report compiled by the
Operational Research Section of Bomber
Command concerning attacks in the Ruhr
provides some insight into the opposition
bombers faced in the summer of 1944. Overall,
losses were about the same in daylight as at
night – 1.3 percent. Flak, however, was much
more effective by day, inflicting damage on 36.7
percent of the aircraft as compared to 2.5 percent
by night, showing the advantages of visual fire
control in contrast to the challenges of radar
directed fire at night. The Ruhr, moreover, was
the most heavily defended target attacked by
Bomber Command. The following table
illustrates the differences in loss rates against
targets which were strongly, moderately, or
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weakly defended, as well as the protection
provided to bombers by cloud cover:
German fighters had ceased to appear by day,
but still posed the greatest risk at night, with 86
reported attacks. Overall losses for the month
of September 1944 were very low, and now still
lower for day operations than for those at night.
The shift to daylight bombing compelled
changes in the tactics employed by Bomber
Command. Following the strategy of the USAAF,
the RAF began to employ fighter escorts, and
these played a large part in discouraging daylight
sorties by the Luftwaffe.36 In the early years of
the war tight, self-defending bomber formations
had been used in daylight, although Luftwaffe
fighters still found it very easy either to break
up the formation or attack the group from the
flanks.37 With the switch to night raids, Bomber
Command had introduced the bomber stream,
but it would have been vulnerable in daylight
visibility. Bomber Command rejected the
American practice of tight daylight formations,
as it would be difficult and time consuming to
retrain crews, and adopted looser formations,
known as “gaggles.” Individual gaggles contained
40 to 70 aircraft which formed up in the air at a
distinct landmark chosen before take-off. Lead
aircraft were painted with distinct markings to
simplify identification. Once over the target, the
aircraft would vary their heights between 3,000
and 4,000 feet as protection against flak.38 These
initiatives showed the readiness of Harris and
his group commanders to develop alternatives
to night area bombing.
During October Bomber Command mounted
15 daylight operations. The initial raid, on 5
October against Wilhelmshaven, was not a
success because heavy cloud cover resulted in
scattered bombing.39 The following day, 6
October, two raids against oil targets, Sterkrade
and Scholven/Buer, benefitted from clear weather
that facilitated bomb aiming, and photo
reconnaissance confirmed heavy-damage.40 The
next day there were accurate attacks on rail
facilities at Kleve and Emmerich.41
On 13 October 1944 Bomber Command, the
US 8th Air Force and the Tactical Air Forces
received a directive for Operation “Hurricane,”
a massed attack on “areas selected from the
undamaged parts of the major industrial cities
of the Ruhr.”42 The objective was to destroy
economic and military resources of the Ruhr and
“to demonstrate to the enemy in Germany
generally the overwhelming superiority of the
Allied Air Forces in this theatre.”43
Harris dispatched 1,014 aircraft against
Duisburg, the first target, during the day on 14
October, followed that night by another 1,005.
The reported results of both the day and night
attacks included heavy damage to industrial
plants, warehouses, dockside and railway
buildings, and railway tracks throughout town.44
Losses included 14 aircraft during the day raid
and seven at night, all from flak. The high losses
during the day were attributed to the early arrival
of aircraft which attacked before the flak
positions were suppressed.45
The attack on Bonn, on 18 October, ushered
in a new phase in Bomber Command technology.
The radar aid G-H had been developed and
tested in 1943, but it was not put into regular
use. As a blind bombing aid, G-H proved
superior to both its predecessors, GEE and H2S.
However, the reliance on ground stations limited
its range, and the deep penetrations into
Germany made by Bomber Command in 1943
precluded its use at that time. By the fall of 1944
ground stations could be moved to the liberated
areas of France and the accuracy of G-H was
tested by equipping an entire formation, 3
Group. When bad weather washed out several
operations, the commander of 3 Group selected
Bonn, as it had not been bombed previously,
allowing the results of the test raid to be properly
*Destroyed by Falling Bombs35
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assessed.46 The raid was a complete success,
destroying many large buildings in the city
centre, including the main railway station.47
 On the night of 23 October the whole
command dispatched a thousand-plane raid on
Essen, followed by another attack by 771 aircraft
on the 25th48 Intelligence indicated that most of
the flammable buildings had been destroyed by
fire in no fewer than 23 previous attacks on the
city, so 90 percent of the bombs dropped were
high explosive. Encouraging results included
further damage to the Krupps plant and severe
damage to the rail yards.49 German reports show
that the damage accomplished in the day raid
surpassed that of the heavier night raid, with
1,163 buildings destroyed and 820 people killed,
compared with 607 buildings destroyed and 662
people killed on the night of the 23rd.50 Cologne
suffered heavily under a similar daylight raid,
again by 771 aircraft, on 28 October.51 In total,
2,239 blocks of flats and 15 industrial premises
were classed as totally destroyed.52 With these
raids Bomber Command proved it could be fully
as effective against area targets during the day
as it was at night.
Bomber Command continued its efforts
against oil targets with raids on Wanne-Eickel,
Homberg, and Leverkusen. Air crew observed
thick black smoke billowing from a direct hit on
an oil storage tank at Wanne-Eickel, which
impeded visibility to some extent, although
photos confirmed damage to several associated
buildings.53 A German report, however, tells of
the destruction of a nearby chemical plant, which
may have been mistaken as the target through
the smoke.54 No reports on the results from
Leverkusen could be found. Homberg came
under attack on 25 October, the same day as the
heavy raid on Essen, showing that Bomber
Command had reached new levels of capability
and strength. The two raids comprised of a total
of 1,014 aircraft, 771 to Essen and 243 to
Homberg. Cloud covered the target and it was
believed that the early hits on the target were
scattered, with greater concentration being
attained in the later stages.55
The record of Bomber Command operations
in October 1944 shows that Harris carried out
the oil and transportation directives and then
complied with the new plan for Operation
“Hurricane,” which made cities in the Ruhr the
priority for the rest of the month, with oil and
transportation targets as alternates.56
Operations in November conformed even
more closely to the priorities established by the
air staff. Bomber Command carried out 17
daylight raids, ten against oil, three against
transportation and four against cities. Night
operations included six against transportation
targets, five directed at oil refineries and ten area
attacks on cities. Loss rates remained low, with
a total of 1.1 percent. Daylight losses were lower,
at .8 percent, compared with the nighttime loss
rate of 1.3 percent .57
Of the oil targets, Homberg’s Meebeck plant
received the most attention. On 1 November, 228
aircraft sortied, but some crews failed to spot
the markers in the heavy cloud cover and could
not attack. One Lancaster was lost to flak.58 The
next day, in clear weather, a good concentration
of bombs produced large fires,59 at the cost of
five planes shot down as the anti-aircraft
defences also benefitted from the good visibility.
In the third raid, on 8 November, the initial strike
went well but the ensuing smoke led to scattered
bombing by later crews. Stormy weather
interfered with the attack on 20 November,
Halifax aircraft of 431 Squadron await their next mission
over occupied Europe, June 1944.
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causing many aircraft to lose formation and
bomb erratically. Finally, on 21 November,
persistence paid off. There was “a huge sheet of
yellow flame and much smoke up to 10,000
feet.”60 Estimates were that the plant had lost
94.2 percent of its capacity.61
The Nordstern synthetic oil plant at
Gelsenkirchen also suffered heavy damage in an
attack by 738 aircraft on 6 November. Smoke
from explosions and a “red glow”62 quickly
obscured the aiming point so that later crews
focused their attention on the town itself, where
destruction included much of the town centre, a
chemical works, the steel casting works of
Vereinigte Stahlwerke, A.G., and the central rail
station and marshalling yard.63 Moderate flak
brought down five aircraft, and crews claimed
spotting one or two German fighters, which did
not attack.64 In the next raid, on 23 November, 3
Group used G-H in 10/10 cloud and judged the
attack as accurate. Four raids had targetted the
Nordstern plant since June, and it was estimated
that 96.6 percent of its production had been lost
by 30 November.65 The remaining oil targets for
daylight missions in November were Wanne-
Eickel, Castrop-Rauxel, Dortmund, Bottrop and
Osterfeld. Thick cloud over Wanne-Eickel forced
attacks on secondary targets. The other
operations were deemed highly successful, as in
each case vital installations have been destroyed
and the plants put out of action for a
considerable period.”66
During November the RAF made two area
attacks on Solingen, and one each on Munster
and Dortmund. In the first raid on Solingen, on
4 November, the bombing was scattered and four
aircraft were lost. Attacks the next day, even
though the city was completely covered by cloud,
destroyed, according to German sources, 1,300
houses and 16 industrial buildings, with damage
to a further 1,600 buildings. As many as 1,882
people died under the bombs.67 At Munster some
damage was observed on the railway and an army
headquarters and barracks, but little else was
hit.68 The Dortmund raid suffered from bad
weather, causing target marking inaccuracies
and scattered bombing.69
After making only two attacks against
transportation facilities in November,70 Bomber
Command committed no fewer than 17 daylight
and 14 night raids on this class of target during
December. Attacks early in the month targeted
water transportation, but intensive strikes
against ground transportation began when the
Germans launched their counteroffensive in the
Ardennes on 16 December.
The industrial cities of Oberhausen and
Witten, in the Ruhr valley, and Hamm, on the
edge of the Ruhr, were Bomber Command’s
daylight area targets in December. No 3 Group
executed all three of the raids using G-H. Damage
to Oberhausen on 4 December included the main
rail station, a chemical plant, and a colliery, as
well as considerable business and residential
destruction.71 Only one aircraft was lost, to flak.
The next day ’s attack on Hamm, by 94
Lancasters that bombed through cloud,
destroyed 39 percent of the city’s built-up area
according to the British Bombing Survey Unit.72
All aircraft returned safely.
The town of Witten had not previously been
attacked by Bomber Command, and for this
reason had become important to the Germans
as a route for rail traffic diverted from other
blocked routes. The primary target of a raid on
12 December was the Ruhrstahl Steelworks,
which escaped unscathed, but there was severe
damage throughout the city.73 Losses were high,
with eight aircraft out of a total 140, or 5.7
percent, failing to return. At least four of the
missing airplanes were seen to have been
destroyed by 60 German fighters which
intercepted the force over the target. This was
the first instance of loss due to fighter action,
although a few isolated attacks had taken place
earlier in the month.74
Bomber Command aircrew encountered no
fighters and lost no aircraft to flak during the
two raids on oil targets made in December. On 3
December there was a small raid by 93 aircraft
on the Hansa oil plant at Dortmund. Although
undertaken through thick cloud, the attack was
believed to have resulted in accurate bombing.75
A raid by Mosquitoes on Duisburg on 11
December was scattered, but considerable
damage was observed in the Meiderich benzol
plant, as well as at several industrial premises
including the steelworks.76 The latter attack
confirmed Harris’s doubts about precision
attacks in general, and the priority for oil plants
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in particular. “[A]rea attacks,” he wrote to Portal
on 22 December, “produce the best effect, and
on the entire war machine, whereas attacks on
oil plants do nothing at all unless they hit the oil
plant. The fact that we have fortuitously knocked
out six Benzol plants in the course of the area
attacks in the Ruhr precisely supports my
argument...We could not have knocked them out
by looking for them.” 77
Mixed results characterized Bomber
Command ’s other daylight oil and
communication attacks in December. On the
11th, through 10/10ths cloud, 3 Group launched
a combined raid against two targets in Osterfeld,
the benzol plant and the railway yards.
Photographs showed some damage to the eastern
end of the oil plant, and numerous craters in
the marshalling yard which, however, work crews
had already filled in by 24 December.78 In fact,
the ability of the Germans to effect readily repairs
necessitated constant reconnaissance of
targets after they had been hit. The short-term
nature of much of the damage compelled
Bomber Command to launch several attacks
against even those targets which had been
heavily bombed in the past.79 There were,
however, better results from attacks on the
marshalling yards at Rheydt on 27 December,80
and at Koblenz, one of the main centres serving
the Ardennes battlefront, on 29 December.
The new year opened with a daylight attack
on the Dortmund-Ems Canal on 1 January 1945.
The strike was successful. The 102 Lancasters
and two Mosquitoes caused a large breach in
the previously attacked and repaired canal,
producing considerable flooding.81 To help the
Allied armies countering the German offensive
in the Ardennes, the RAF struck several railway
centres. On 5 January, in clear weather, 3 Group
attacked the railway yards at Ludwigshafen.
A Lancaster from 3 Group RAF, with its bomb bay doors open, carries out a bombing raid on the Pasing railway yards
in Munich, Germany on 19 April 1945.  The cloud cover resulted in the target being located using G-H. Post-raid
reconnaissance reported that the bombing appeared to be concentrated.
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Intense flak over the target caused the bombing
to scatter, although the results proved positive
even with this difficulty.82 During the month there
were also successful attacks on the railway
facilities at Krefeld, Saarbrucken, and Cologne.83
Bomber Command targeted four oil
installations for daylight operations during the
month of January, Dortmund and Castrop-
Rauxel on the 5th, and Recklinghausen and
Bochum on the 15th. The crews reported good
results in the three attacks where there was not
heavy cloud cover, but these were small
operations, each with fewer than a hundred
sorties,84 and no supporting evidence appears
in the “Weekly Digests.”
The period from the end of the Ardennes
offensive, roughly mid-January 1945, to the end
of the war is the most controversial part of the
Bomber Command story. Historians, politicians
and journalists employing hindsight have used
the fact that the war ended in May 1945 to argue
that the decision-makers ought to have known
this in advance of the fact and scaled back
violence accordingly in the early months of 1945.
As historian Terry Copp has pointed out, no one
was more guilty of this inconsistency than
Winston Churchill, who criticized the bombing
of Dresden two months after he had ordered
Bomber Command to undertake Operation
“Thunderclap” which mandated the destruction
of Dresden and other German cities.85 The reality
is that in early 1945, after the unanticipated and
truly remarkable stiffening of German resistance
in the fall and winter of 1944, there was a
widespread conviction that Germany possessed
the will and the capacity to prolong the war at
least until late 1945.
“Thunderclap” began on the night of 13
February at Dresden, and may be said to have
ended a month later with the last raid of the war
on Nuremberg. Bomber Command’s heavy area
raids on cities, in response to the “Thunderclap”
directive, did not mean that oil and
communication targets were neglected, nor did
it mean lack of support for the land battle.
A raid on the railway centre in the town of
Monchengladbach opened operations in
February 1945. Cloudy conditions prevailed over
the target, but photographic cover proved that
“useful” damage was caused to the main
station.86 The synthetic oil plant at Wanne-Eickel
was attacked on 7 February, but winter weather
scattered the force, and only 75 of the 100
Lancasters despatched were able to bomb.87 The
weather improved around mid-month, when
Bomber Command began a four day offensive
A 4000-pound bomb and a load of incendiaries fall through the very cloudy sky over Dortmund, Germany on 12 March
1945.  The daylight raid on Dortmund set the record of the most aircraft sent to a single target - 1,108 (including 192 from
6 Group) - and dropped 4,851 tons of bombs.  Only two aircraft were lost.
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against the city of Wesel, in support of First
Canadian and Ninth US Army. Following close
on the heels of USAAF attacks on the 14th and
the 16th, Bomber Command struck the town on
the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th, although the raid
on 17 February had to be aborted because of
poor visibility. Photographs were obscured by
cloud and smoke from burning buildings, but
severe damage could still be seen, and Bomber
Command crews reported a high concentration
of bombs on the railway yards in the final raid
on the 19th.88
Bomber Command targeted two Ruhr cities
for daylight raids in February, Essen and Mainz.
Aircrews attacked Essen through 10/10ths cloud
cover, aiming at sky markers, on 23 February.
An extremely accurate attack, new damage
ravaged the marshalling yards at the Krupps
Works, affecting two machine shops, a foundry,
and various other buildings.89 The raid on Mainz
also took place under 10/10 cloud cover, again
employing Oboe with sky markers and again with
good results. German reports described this raid
as the worst received by Mainz during the war. A
total of 5,670 buildings were destroyed in this
raid alone, and between 1,100 and 1,200 people
were killed.90
By far the bulk of Bomber Command’s energy
in February was expended on oil targets, and
nine attacks were made in daylight.
Gelsenkirchen, which contained the Alma Pluto
benzol plant and the Nordstern synthetic oil
plant, was the focus of four assaults. The final
raid against Alma Pluto, on 27 February, yielded
the desired results. Through thick cloud, 3
Group undertook a G-H attack which severely
damaged all vital installations at the plant.
Reports estimated that the plant had been
rendered inoperative for a period of three to four
weeks.91 The following day Bomber Command
turned its attention to the Nordstern plant with
another G-H raid by 3 Group. Photographs taken
9 March confirmed that damage was very severe,
and estimates were that it been knocked out for
“at least a month.”92 Raids against plants at
Kamen,93 Osterfeld, and Dortmund produced
similar results.94
Bomber Command executed more raids
during the month of March than in any of the
previous six months. As the Germans steadily
lost ground, the RAF pushed its advantage
against oil, transport, and cities, in that order.
A total of 72 attacks were made, 45 in daylight.
The weight of these attacks during the day
exceeded the tonnage dropped on Germany at
any time during the war.95
Area raids opened the month, with attacks
on Mannheim on 1 March and Cologne the next
day. With the battlefront extending so deep into
Germany, attacks on German cities also served
more than ever to block the movement of
German troops and materiel. Both cities had
been heavily bombed over the course of the war,
making it difficult to assess the new damage.
Photographs taken on 2 March, however, showed
many fires raging in the centre of Mannheim,
and severe damage to many residential and
industrial premises. Because of the destruction,
this was the last large raid sent to Mannheim.96
The attacks by a total of 858 aircraft on Cologne
achieved an accurate concentration over the
aiming point. Photo reconnaissance the following
day showed destroyed bridges, fresh destruction
in the main rail station area, and craters and
debris blocking roads.97 These were the last
bombs to fall on Cologne, which was captured
by American troops on 6 March.
Cities in the Ruhr again experienced the
weight of the bombs, in Essen on 11 March,
Dortmund on 12 March, and Wuppertal/Barmen
on 13 March. The raids on Essen and Dortmund
corresponded to USAAF raids which were
carried out just before and after the RAF attacks.
New damage proved extensive in all three towns,
with Dortmund being effectively put out of
production.98 The Allied assault across the Rhine
scheduled for late March made these attacks part
of the overall army strategy for encircling
German forces in the Ruhr.
Bomber Command had reached the apex of
its capabilities by March, as shown by the
accuracy and destruction achieved by its attacks,
in conjunction in some instances with the USAAF,
against transportation facilities through which
the German forces sustained their resistance to
advancing Allied troops. Marshalling yards at
Recklinghausen and Hamm received a brutal
pounding on 20 March, destroying sidings,
tracks rolling stock and buildings.99 Similar
destruction followed raids on 21 March against
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the railway centre at Rhein, and attacks on 22
March to Hildesheim, Dulmen, Dorsten and
Bocholt. Hildesheim was particularly hard-hit.
This raid, the only one visited on Hildesheim
during the war, effectively destroyed 70 percent
of the town, including its railway installations.100
Bridges at Bremen and Bad Oeynhausen both
took direct hits and the rail tracks serving them
were also severed.101
On 24 March Allied armies crossed the
Rhine, and Bomber Command directed its efforts
over the next two days to disrupting the enemy’s
transport to the bridgehead. Sterkrade and
Gladbeck were hit on 24 March. In both cases
rail lines to and from the cities were blocked,
and in Sterkrade the marshalling yard was full
of rolling stock, which was also destroyed.
Hannover, Munster and Osnabruck received the
same treatment on the 25th. The sidings at
Hannover were also fully loaded, and much stock
was destroyed.102
Bomber Command also struck heavily
against oil plants in March 1944, with a total of
16 attacks. Only five of these sites received more
than one raid, as the tide had turned in the war
and the constant bombardment began to bear
fruit. The USAAF, although making its main effort
against transport facilities and airfields, also
attacked oil targets during this period. The
plants at Datteln and Emsche Lippe North and
South, were attacked on 7 March by the USAAF,
and 9 March by Bomber Command. All the
plants sustained heavy damage, but it is
impossible to judge who caused the most
destruction.103 The report for the week ending
18 March 1945 briefly mentions that four oil
plants had been rendered inactive, including
Castrop-Rauxel and Emsche Lippe North and
South, which were all attacked by Bomber
Command in daylight.104Raids on Scholven Buer
on the 10th, Bremen on the 21st, and Saltzgitter
on the 29th were assessed as inflictling less
damage.
By April the war was drawing to a close. As
Allied gains steadily reduced the amount of
territory under enemy control, Bomber
Command curtailed its activities sharply and
undertook only 27 operations. The successes of
the previous month enabled them to withdraw
from their commitment to smash oil targets.
Although a total of seven raids against oil ensued,
only one took place in daylight. Transport and
general area bombing made up the bulk of the
operations. Eleven attacks were against
transport, five in the day, and nine raids were
made against cities, four in the day. Losses held
at 1.2 percent overall, with the daylight rate still
remaining lower at 0.5 percent.
The three cities targeted for bombing during
daylight were Nordhausen, Heligoland, and
Bremen, port cities that supported the U-boat
force, which still posed a serious threat to Allied
shipping. Nordhausen received two attacks, on
3 and 4 April, as it contained barracks which
were believed to house German military
personnel. Bomber Command reported the raid
as a success, with direct hits on the airfield,
hangars, railway tracks and sidings, and the
barrack blocks. Unbeknownst to them at the
time, the barracks actually housed concentration
camp prisoners and foreign workers, many of
whom were killed.105 Bomber Command
mounted a large raid by 969 aircraft against the
island of Heligoland on 18 April. Very heavy
damage was reported and confirmed by
photographs for all targets, which included the
naval base, signals network, oil tanks, the town,
and the airfield on the neighbouring island of
Dune.106
In preparation for a forthcoming attack by
the British XXX Corps, the port city of Bremen
was bombed on 22 April, but only 195 aircraft
out of a force of 767 were able to drop their
weapons before smoke obscured the target.
Bremen fell to the Allies four days later, the first
major German port to be captured.107 No results
were reported for the one raid on oil at
Regensburg on 20 April, which was the final oil
target attacked by RAF Bomber Command
during the war.
Five transport targets completed Bomber
Command’s operations for April and, indeed, for
the war itself. The attack on the Leipzig
marshalling yards on 10 April came on the heels
of a successful USAAF raid on the 6th, and was
itself followed by a night assault by the RAF.
Damage was exceptional, but it is impossible to
separate the results from the three attacks.108
All rail links in Nuremberg were cut on 11 April
by an attack of 129 Halifax bombers, which hit
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their target with great accuracy. On the same
day, another group of 100 Halifaxes, 14
Lancasters and eight Mosquitoes inflicted severe
damage on the Bayreuth marshalling yards, a
ball bearing works, and the Bayreuth/Bindace
Airfield.109 The last operation against transport
targets took place on 24 April against the
marshalling yards at Bad Oldesloe. Severed
tracks and debris entirely stopped through
traffic.110 The attack on Bad Oldesloe represented
the final mission for daylight bombing crews in
the RAF. Their job had ended.
* * * * *
Between the opening volleys of the war in 1939and the autumn of 1944 the RAF vastly
improved its results in daylight bombing. The
debilitation of the Luftwaffe, a byproduct of
preparations for the invasion of Normandy,
enabled Bomber Command to range much more
freely over the skies of Germany, and contributed
to lower loss rates and improved accuracy.
Precision targets such as oil plants and railway
yards were routinely attacked and struck by RAF
bombers. Although the command had not
achieved anything near pinpoint accuracy,
targets could be destroyed in clear conditions,111
even if in important instances the Germans still
displayed an ability to repair facilities or make
alternate arrangements to restore services that
far exceeded Allied estimates of their
capabilities.112 With the assistance of the radio
and radar aids that had been developed for the
night bombing campaign, Bomber Command was
often able to achieve results even when cloud
covered the target. Blind-bombing accuracy
improved with the introduction of G-H to 3
Group.113
According to one recent study, RAF crews
were more successful than their counterparts in
the USAAF in locating and striking a target when
visual aiming was not possible.114 This ability was
a direct result of the extensive training British
crews received on navigation aids. The devices
which allowed Bomber Command crews to find
a target at night proved equally as effective in
A Lancaster makes a daylight raid against an enemy dockworks.
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the day, especially when aided
by some visual sighting. As
originally envisioned, the bomber
war would take place in the day
against specific targets. By the
fall of 1944 the capability to
achieve results during daylight
hours had finally arrived. The
intervening years had enabled
Bomber Command to develop its
skills in darkness, and it could
now pursue its objectives day
and night.
The daylight bombing
missions conformed more closely
to the goals set out for Bomber
Command than those
undertaken at night. The
directive of 25 September 1944
made oil the top priority with
transportation and commun-
ications in second place, followed
by industrial targets when the
weather precluded accuracy in
attacking the primary targets.115
The total number of daylight
operations between September
1944 and April 1945 amounted
to 153. Of these attacks, Bomber
Command directed 44 percent
against oil, 36 percent against
transport and 20 percent against
industrial area targets. Out of a
total of 166 night raids, oil
accounted for 28 percent of the
effort, transport for 25 percent
and cities for 46 percent. The
more precise targets such as oil
and transport were wisely given
higher priority in daylight, when
visibility permitted greater
accuracy than could have been
achieved at night. Examination
of the targets chosen by Bomber
Command for daylight missions
clearly illustrates adherence to
the directive issued in September
1944, and shows a clear
distinction from those targets
chosen for night attacks.
These two photographs show the daylight raid on Hannover, Germany.  This was one of
three daylight attacks carried out by Bomber Command on 25 March 1945 (the others
were against Münster and Osnabrück) designed to interdict the main reinforcement
routes into the Rhine battle area. The attack on Hannover was carried out by 267
Lancasters and 8 Mosquitos from 1, 6 and 8 Groups.  One Lancaster was lost.
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Arthur Harris has often been criticized by
students of the air war for following his own
agenda of retribution against the German
people.116 By his own admission Harris
vehemently opposed the choice of oil over area
targets; “I fear the abandonment of any priority
for area attacks with all the vast harm they have
done to the enemy war machine, in favour of a
type of attack which if it fails to achieve its object
achieves nothing. Nothing whatsoever. Worse
than nothing.”117 However, the evidence of the
daylight offensive proves Harris’s compliance
with the orders he received, as he focused the
bulk of his command’s attention on the targets
selected by his superiors.
Bomber Command achieved a high degree
of accuracy in its daylight attacks. The target
was more often bombed than missed, even
though the level of destruction varied from severe
to negligible. Bomber Command also utilized its
force in daylight in a manner which
corresponded closely to the directives issued by
the Air Staff. Oil, transportation and industrial
targets were attacked in the order of priority
specified by senior authories. The evidence
further shows that Bomber Command quickly
reacted to the changing conditions of the war
and demonstrated flexibility in its strategies.
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